Review 22.8
6-26 June 1997

"Long live Father Suharto, Father Arafat and the Indonesian Armed Forces!", shouted the Palestinian Ambassador to Indonesia, Ribhi Awad, at a recent gathering of Muslims in Jakarta. Other speakers poured scorn upon Indonesian figures perceived to be pro-Israel. However, this scene is only one aspect of the complex intersection between Islam and politics in Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim nation.

The tirade against Israel was led by the academic Amien Rais, chairman of the 28 million-strong Muhammadiyah organisation, and the Indonesian Committee for World Muslims Solidarity (KISDI), whose statement said that sympathisers with Israel "should know that Israelis are cold-blooded terrorists and there is no way they will let the Palestinians regain their homeland." KISDI announced it would establish an anti-Zionist taskforce to block any Zionist influences in Indonesia and called on the Indonesian government, ASEAN and the World Islamic Organisation (OIC) to boycott Israel in every international forum.

Though the alleged "Zionist sympathisers" were not mentioned by name, their prime target was undoubtedly Abdurrahman Wahid, the charismatic chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest non-government Islamic organisation in the world with 30 million members. Wahid recently accepted an invitation to join as a director Shimon Peres' Institute for Peace at the Hebrew University, and is due to visit Israel in October for the Institute's inauguration. He was also part of an Indonesian academic delegation to Israel sponsored by the Hebrew University in 1994, where he enthused over the lessons Israel offered Indonesia in economic development, democracy and the management of diverse populations.

Described as a secular nationalist and a neo-modernist Islamic thinker, Wahid is committed to democratic pluralism in Indonesia rather than an Islamic state. He founded the Forum Demokrasi in 1991 and has worked closely with other human rights groups and opposition politicians, most notably Megawati Sukarnoputri, the ousted leader of the Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI).

Wahid told the Review this week that he is unconcerned about the "slander campaign" against him for being "an agent of Mossad, a Zionist or one of those things. I don't care. It's so small, you know. In a country with nearly 200 million citizens, one or two thousand is nothing. They will not make it." He says he has answered the accusations for his congregations all over Indonesia (up to 50,000 people each gathering) and he is satisfied with their response. "In due time, if the government decides to have relations with Israel, it will stick," he says simply. Abdurrahman Wahid's attitude to Israel is at odds with official government policy, which remains opposed to diplomatic ties out of solidarity with the Palestinians.

Contact at an unofficial level has continued however. President Suharto met former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin twice, in 1993 in Jakarta and again in 1995 in New York (during the UN 50th birthday celebrations); the meetings centred mainly on Middle East developments, though establishing trade relations was also discussed. Current trade between the two countries is at a low level, mainly in coal, oil (from Indonesia) and agricultural technology (from Israel), and it is conducted indirectly - mainly via Singapore.

At present, Israelis may officially enter Indonesia only in organised groups, though individuals arriving at the border will usually be quietly issued a visa. Indonesian visits to Israel will be given a boost by seminars given by Israeli tourism agents in Jakarta and Surabaya, the next of which is scheduled for this month. This is the first time Israel has been able to promote itself in this way and the response is said to be very positive so far.

Also, while in Amman, Jordan last November, President Suharto spoke of the shortage of quarters in Saudi Arabia for Indonesian pilgrims to Mecca and mentioned Jerusalem as an alternative pilgrimage. Negotiations have been taking place recently between El Al and Garuda (the Indonesian state-owned carrier) to co-ordinate flight schedules using Bangkok as a connecting point; all of which points to on-going high level contact between

Indonesian and Israeli officials. Notwithstanding these positive developments, the question of whether Indonesia will establish dip- lomatic relations with Israel is bound up with the outcome of the Middle East peace process. Abdurrahman Wahid believes a lot depends on the sensitivity of Indonesia's Arab friends: "We cannot wreck our relationship with the Arabs just because we would like to do business with the Israelis." However, he believes Indonesians would accept ties with Israel. "Of course there would be demonstrations, effigies burnt and so forth but for the people at large, they are looking at results. If the relationship is something beneficial, they will take it," he says.

Improvements in the relationship have slowed down as the Oslo agreements have stalled. In February, President Suharto restated his position in a letter to Egypt's President Mubarak that Indonesia will not normalise its ties with Israel unless all former Arab territories are returned. Jakarta was also prompt in calling on Israel to halt the development of Har Homa. Meanwhile, cordial relations have continued with the PLO - Yasser Arafat was warmly received in Jakarta in 1992 at the Non-Aligned Movement conference and last met Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas at the OIC meeting in Islamabad, Pakistan in April.

Underlying Indonesia's attitude to Israel and the peace process is Indonesia's perception of itself as a largely Muslim society. Around 90 percent of Indonesia's 190 million inhabitants are Sunni Muslim, but their politicisation under an Islamic banner has always been discouraged by the Suharto Government.

The official state ideology of Pancasilia, established upon independence, has always taken precedence, based upon belief in one God and decision making through consensus. It is credited with holding Indonesia's hundreds of ethnic groups together in one pluralistic nation. Islam has long been the only obvious alternative source of mass mobilisation and thus, an implicit threat to security, particularly in regional areas. The Government sought to contain the various Muslim parties by amalgamating them into the United Development Party (PPP), which was not allowed to have Islam in its title nor a religious symbol as its logo.

The re-election of President Suharto's Golkar Party Government on May 29 was never in doubt. The dramatic decline in support for the Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI) has made the Islamic-oriented PPP the main opposition party, moving from 17 percent support in 1992 to 22.6 percent. But the scale of Golkar's victory (up from 68.1 to 74.3 percent) prompted Abdurrahman Wahid to interpret the result as "a real repudiation of ideological Islam" as promoted by elements in the PPP, and a vote for "unity, moderation and tolerance."

However, the lead-up to the poll provided evidence enough that Indonesia's vast Muslim constituency certainly has the potential to shake the nation to its roots. And now that allegations of poll-rigging have surfaced, the tensions of the election period seem set to continue. The wave of rioting since last October, mainly in rural Java and Kalimantan, saw Muslim crowds attack Christian churches, Buddhist temples and property belonging to the ethnic Chinese minority. The national election was conducted amidst the worst campaign violence in 30 years of Suharto rule, with over 200 killed and hundreds injured in rallies and related incidents which descended into chaos and mob violence. The recent upheavals have been attributed to a number of factors. These include discontent with Indonesia's growing disparities of wealth, official corruption, the extent of the Suharto family's vested interests, the affluence of the ethnic Chinese and Indonesia's highly restrictive form of democracy (which saw Megawati Sukarnoputri excluded from the election). Though the causes are varied, the accumulating grievances of significant sections of the Muslim population raise the possibility of a rise in Islamic fundamentalism, which could then lead to calls to establish an Islamic state.

Abdurrahman Wahid downplays the threat of Islamic radicalism, saying that the rhetoric of Saudi Arabia, Libya and most recently, Iran, has limited appeal. "They issue calls to Islamic solidarity and warn against Western, decadent civilisation - it may inspire the radicals but the radicals cannot win the contest," he says. Wahid also believes the Islamic-based PPP will need to find more moderate leaders to increase its support, which rose during the election largely because Megawati was barred from leading the secular PDI.

Periodic outbursts of Muslim protest have occurred in the past however, notably during the 1980s when the government was seen as anti-Muslim because of the 1985 Societies Law, which required all organisations to adopt the state ideology of Pancasilia. During the 1990s, the Suharto Government has moved to negate any shift to a politicised Islam through symbolic overtures and by co-opting leading Muslim figures (some analysts believe such a move was necessary to offset waning support in the miltary). The government has built mosques, sponsored the haj pilgrimage (to Mecca) and promoted Muslim banks, schools, think-tanks, films and festivals. President Suharto made a haj pilgrimage himself in 1991 and earlier this year, faultlessly recited Arabic prayers at the end of the Muslim fasting month in a highly stylised Islamic setting, in front of several hundred thousand people and a national TV audience.

The creation of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in 1990, with President Suharto's endorsement, provided a means of containing Muslim intellectual ferment. Research and Technology Minister Yusuf Habibie was made its head and the organisation was promoted as an avenue for Muslim thought to reach the government. In practice, the ICMI has become more a vehicle for rising in the government apparatus than a serious arena for discussion and has been criticised as such by Abdurrahman Wahid, who refused to join the organisation - "As long as they think Islam is an ideology, then I will not participate," he says. "Islam is a way of life. Its adherents should follow it voluntarily, not needing any legislation from the state."

Even Amien Rais, one of the ICMI's leaders, was recently pushed from his position after criticising the government over foreign ownership. Rais remains chair of Muhammadiyah (a scripturally-based organisation) and has continued his outspokenness, warning not only of Zionist influences but particularly of an advancing "Christianisation" of Indonesia - referring to the growing economic strength of the Chinese minority.

Despite Golkar's overwhelming victory and the likelihood that President Suharto will seek another five-year term in 1998, the recent unrest shows that the political situation in Indonesia remains fluid - subject to ever-shifting personal alliances and enmities within the government, the military and organisations like the ICMI and Wahid's Nahdlatul Ulama. The Muslim equation and its implications for Israel is not expected to alter in the short term, but with Indonesia's history of political upheaval, this conclusion is not an overly confident one.