Review 22.3
1 March- 21 March, 1997
IRAN AND MALAYSIAOn February 3, 1997 the Iranian Ambassador to Malaysia met with Malaysia's Deputy Defence Minister Abdallah Fadzil Che Wan. The two men reviewed the prospects of further defence cooperation between Malaysia and Iran. Both Ambassador Hoseyn Fereydum, and Minister Che Wan expressed their countries' willingness to exchange expertise in defence related matters and technology. The meeting also reviewed the imminent visit by Malaysian Defence Minister Syed Hamid Bin Syed Jaafar to Tehran. The maturing relationship between Malaysia and Iran forms the basis of current Iranian penetration into South East Asia, and has been built over the last several years, with joint ministerial commissions and pan-Islamic cooperation. Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani visited Malaysia in October 1994, and since then the relationship has taken off. Bilateral contacts have been initiated in myriad areas, including trade, technology sharing, agriculture, housing, administration and economic issues. The meetings between Rafsanjani and Malaysian ministers produced agreement that Islamic nations needed to take a more active role in settling issues affecting Muslims. Agreement was also reached to boost trade and investment ties, which they described as "quite lacking compared to cooperation in other fields." Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir has also travelled to Iran frequently over the past few years.
Trade between Iran and Malaysia has increased substantially since 1994, with a 30% increase in the first half of 1996 alone. Iran now ranks as Malaysia's fifth largest trading partner in the Middle East and southern European region, behind the Gulf States, Jordan and Turkey. At the November 13, 1996 meeting of the Malaysia/Iran Joint Commission the Malaysians offered to act as facilitators for Iranian expansion in South East Asia.
In September 1996, Iranian Vice President Dr Hamid Mirzadeh visited Kuala Lumpur, meeting Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Abdallah, who flagged increased exports of high technology goods to Iran.
The area of high technology probably provides part of the military cooperation between the countries. Two years ago Malaysia acquired Russian built MiG-29 fighters. This decision represented a surprise for Western governments and aircraft manufacturers, whose products, though more expensive are more reliable and provide a greater parts and support backup. A key to the Malaysian decision could well have been Iranian assistance in the operation and maintenance of these aircraft. Iran also operates MiG-29 aircraft, and by reliable accounts has developed a technical proficiency in some engineering aspects associated with the fighter. Iranian technicians would be able to provide training and assistance to Malaysian airforce personnel working with the MiGs. Signalling the importance of the relationship, the Iranian Government maintains its largest South East Asian embassy in Kuala Lumpur. This has paid off well for Tehran, which has received a great deal of diplomatic support from Malaysia since 1994. In response to the passing by the US Congress of the Iran/Libya Sanctions Act, Mahathir was critical of US concerns over Iranian involvement in terrorism and violent opposition to the Middle East peace process.
Malaysia's state-owned oil company, Petronas, moved to further engage with Iran. Part of this expansion took the form of a 30 percent stake, via the Petronas subsidiary Carigali, in Iran's Sirri A and E offshore oil fields. The Malaysian move joins TOTAL of France and replaces the US Conoco oil company, which was forced to pull out of the project following the strengthened US boycott of Iran. Petronas was also recently awarded the contract for the 40,000 barrel per day Ballal oil field project.
The political dimension of the Iranian-Malaysian relationship continues to be developed within the framework of increased economic involvement, and in pan-Islamic initiatives and organisations. Both Iran and Malaysia are founding members of the D-8, the Islamic equivalent of the G-7 group of industrialised nations. The D-8, established this January, includes Iran, Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, Nigeria and Bangladesh. Among the states aims of the group is to form an Islamic common market, including a common Islamic currency, and fostering coordination of the rich resources and industrial potential held by the member states. The group also aims to create a political and military system to solve crises in the world of Islam, such as Afghanistan, Kashmir, Algeria and "Palestine".
The effect of such a group, interfering in the difficult processes engaged in the Middle East peace process could be tragic. Considering Iran's violent opposition to Israel's existence the motives of such a group would necessarily be called into question, yet the pressure it could bring to bear on Europe and even the United States should not be underestimated.
Kuala Lumpur and Tehran are also driving increasingly hard for linking ASEAN with the Iranian-founded Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), and Iranian membership of the Asian Development Bank. Malaysia made the push for Iranian membership of the Asian Bank on May 1, 1996, less than two months after Tehran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati visited Kuala Lumpur and met with Malaysian Foreign Minister Badawi. On March 10, 1996, Velayati announced in Kuala Lumpur that Iran had signed agreements with the member states of ASEAN to pave the way for trade between the ECO and ASEAN.
Malaysia's warm relations with Iran run in stark contrast to its treatment of its own indigenous Shiite Muslim population. In June last year Malaysia continued a severe crackdown on Shiism in the country. Responding to questions about the effect the repression would have on relations with predominantly Shiite Iran, Malaysian Foreign Minister Badawi said on June 23, "The government's move to check Shiism's influence in the country is purely a domestic issue and not an international one... There are many opportunities for us to cooperate with Iran ... we are already cooperating with them on many issues which we share a common position, and I think that's very good." There were reports, however, that Malaysian businessmen were having problems completing agreements in Iran during mid-1996.
The Iranian strategy of boosting the cooperation among Islamic countries through the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the new D-8 grouping, coupled with establishing a Central Asian-Middle Eastern economic grouping (ECO) and fostering relations through the non-aligned movement with non-Muslim states has borne substantial fruit. Malaysia is the strongest Iranian ally in South East Asia, and through its activism in both Islamic and Third World circles Kuala Lumpur, represents an important bridge for Tehran.
Jakarta's relationship with Tehran has long been com plex, in part because Jakarta's relationship with "orthodox" Islam has also always been somewhat complex. Between 87% and 90% of the Indonesian population identify themselves as Muslims, but Indonesia makes no claim to be an Islamic state, instead one governed by the official tolerant ideology of "Pancasilia." And Islam in Indonesia has traditional been a particularly moderate and tolerant version of that religion, largely coexisting comfortably with other faiths.
However, in recent years, sections of Indonesian Islam have been radicalised by an influx of Middle Eastern scholars, and Indonesian scholars trained in the Middle East. As a result, the Indonesian government has shown an increasing tendency to cater publicly to Islamic beliefs internally, and to create "fraternal" Islamic economic and organisational ties in foreign policy. Thus, some sense of Islamic solidarity leaves Indonesia at least somewhat receptive to fraternal Islamic overtures from Iran, a receptivity Iran has been eager to exploit.
This is despite ongoing difficulty with various radical Islamist groups inside Indonesia, many of them clearly inspired in part by Tehran. Thus, in the early 1980's, the Indonesian government claimed to have uncovered attempts by one terrorist Islamic group to solicit support from Iran. There has been ongoing unrest in the northern Sumatran province of Aceh, where rebels, already autonomous, seek to secede and form a true Islamic state. In recent months, Islamic extremism has contributed to large-scale rioting among Javanese Muslims directed against mostly Chinese ethnic Buddhist and Christian minorities and their houses of worship.
This has led Abdurraham Wahid, the moderate leader of Indonesia's largest Muslim organisation, the Nahdlatul Ulama, to speak out against the influence of "Middle East" style Islam in Indonesia, which he says has fostered a "fear of other faiths, of 'Christianisation' for instance," leading to "aggression towards people of other faiths" and to warn against the "manipulation of religion for politics," which could "eventually burn the nation."
Despite the growth of such Islamic extremism and the problems caused, there is no direct evidence of deliberate Iranian attempts to fan the flames in Indonesia (though the same cannot be said of Libya) and both governments have been on increasingly good terms over recent years.
Ties have been especially close since Suharto's 1993 visit to Tehran, the first by an Indonesian leader since the 1979 Revolution in Iran. This was followed up by a return visit by Iranian President Rafsanjani to Jakarta in 1994, which included an agreement for Indonesia to sell Iran Super Puma helicopters. These helicopters are easily modified into helicopter gunships, or used for other military purposes, and indeed Rafsanjani commented that he has "been interested in Super Pumas since the [Iran-Iraq] war... And my past impressions were confirmed." Two further deals since that time have led to further Super Puma sales. Increasing trade ties also began at the same time, with Iran offering to "provide a gateway for Indonesian exports to Iran and the Middle East" in the words Indonesian State Secretary Mordiono. This market access is probably the most important lure Iran holds out for Indonesian ties.
A bilateral Indonesian-Iranian Commission on economic and trade cooperation was established following the 1994 mission. The Commission held its fourth meeting in Jakarta this past November, and discussed expediting yet another Iranian Puma helicopter purchase. The meeting included the Iranian Minister for Trade, Post, Telegraph and Telephone Sayyed Mohammed Gharazi, and led to the signing of a further trade agreement designed to further joint investment in chemicals, mining, steel, textiles, celluloid, and rubber, and to establish joint marketing of products in Central Asia and other former Soviet states.
The closer economic cooperation has also seen closer Indonesian-Iranian cooperation in some international forums. Thus, Indonesia was one of the few states to support Iran's efforts last year to block an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Indonesia also joined an Iranian-organised conference last November designed to develop a security organisation of Indian Ocean states, with Iran, as "reliable anchor of the ship of peace" in the words of Iranian President Rafsanjani.
One of the more important manifestations of greater Indonesian openness to "Islamic ties" abroad has been its willingness to take part with Iran in the new D-8 group. Iran holds high hopes for the D-8 as a source of Islamic power.
Indonesia also hosted the most recent meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Organisation of Islamic Conferences countries in December 1996. This included meetings between Indonesian President Suharto and Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati, concerning Afghanistan and bilateral economic ties. Nonetheless, Indonesia, which wants both good Western ties and a role as a leader of the developing states, must have been concerned at the tone of Velayati's speech at the OIC meeting, where he warned of a Western "undeclared war" on Islam, aimed at the "destruction of the fabric of our societies, our identity and indeed our very being." Jakarta must also worry to some extent at the criticism in the Tehran press of moderate Islamic states like Indonesia. For example, Tehran Radio declared after the OIC meeting that "unilateral and short-term interests of a number of Muslim states has made them refrain from launching a serious struggle against the usurper Zionists."
Iran remains geographically remote from Indonesia, and as long as Jakarta believes there are internal political benefits and external economic benefits to be obtained from close ties with Iran, Indonesia remains fertile ground for Iran's push to expand her influence into Asia. However, unlike Malaysia, the Indonesian regime is not anti-Western or reactionary, and is a comparatively moderating influence in Islamic circles.
Iran lacks any religious basis for ties with the pre-dominantly Roman Catholic Philippines, yet despite some past Iranian funding and support of Philippine Muslim rebel groups, ties have become considerably closer in recent years.
Tehran maintains ties with Muslim separatist groups in the Southern Philippines. Iran was the inspiration for the two most active and radical Muslim groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and extremely violent Abu Sayyaf terrorist group. Both these groups aim to set up an Islamic state, based on Sharia law, along Iranian lines in the islands of Mindanao, Basilan and the Sulu Archipelago, where Muslims are a majority or a sizeable minority. A defector from the Abu Sayyaf groups admitted that donations to charitable religious funds in the Philippines from Iran and other Middle Eastern countries were used for Abu Sayyaf terrorist operations.
The Philippine authorities also charge that Muslim missionaries, mainly from Iran and Pakistan, have helped Abu Sayyaf and other extremist groups recruit members and obtain arms. According to one Christian priest who was held hostage by Abu Sayyaf for 48 days, these foreign missionaries virtually run Abu Sayyaf, "if [the foreign missionaries] tell them [Abu Sayyaf] to kidnap, they kidnap, if they order them to kill, they kill," he reported after escaping his captors. He also noted voluminous quantities of Iranian books and pamphlets at the Abu Sayyaf camp.
And in 1994, the Philippines military claimed that they had "very reliable" information that the youth wing of Abu Sayyaf was run by Mohammed Uri, an Iranian student and funded by Iranian students living in Manila.
The largest Muslim separatist group, the Moro National Liberation Front, which recently signed a peace agreement with the government establishing autonomy for Muslim regions, also received aid and maintains ties with Iran. During the recent meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Conference Foreign Ministers in Jakarta, MNLF head Nur Misuari travelled to Indonesia to meet Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati, both to thank Iran for past support and to seek additional aid from Iran in developing the new autonomous region. Misuari asked for Iranian aid in fisheries, agriculture, irrigation, road-building, and construction. Velayati urged other local Muslim states to help the Philippine Muslims with reconstruction, and invited Misuari to Tehran for further discussions of Iranian aid.
Yet despite all this Iranian-Philippines ties are close. Iran and the Philippines exchanged presidential visits in 1995; when Rafsanjani arrived in Manila, President Ramos of the Philippines described relations between his country and Tehran as "very good". In all, seven agreements on trade and cultural cooperation were signed, and a joint Ministerial Commission on Economic Cooperation established. The two summits were followed up by the visit to Manila of an Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister in 1996. What then, is behind the rush of the Philippines to embrace Iran, despite the problems caused? Economic factors are predominantly in play. The Philippines is heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil; much of the economic discussions have concerned trade in oil products, technical help in building petroleum refineries, and the like. One of the key Tehran-Manila agreements is a guarantee by Tehran that the Philippines will receive a steady supply of oil and oil products. Further, as Ramos has put it, the Philippines see Iran as "the gateway to the Middle East" and also Central Asia and the Caucasus, for Manila's exports.
But there are also security reasons for Manila's rapprochement with Iran. Tehran, looking for international friends, has promised to give the Philippines "assistance" in countering terrorism, largely by Philippine Muslim groups, to support the peace talks between the government and the MNLF. The Iranians would also not give further aid and comfort to extremist groups like Abu Sayyaf.
Of course, there is a price for this; the Philippines had to publicly denounce the US embargo on Iran, and have had to tread very softly around Iranian past and present support for terrorist groups. Thus, in 1994, President Ramos had to order a halt to the arrest of Iranian and Pakistani citizens suspected of aiding Abu Sayyaf "to avoid jeopardising Philippine diplomatic relations with Iran and Pakistan," after Iran protested. There was a further order from Ramos that when alien Muslims had to be arrested for supporting Abu Sayyaf, countries of origin were not to be named. Instead, the euphemism to be used was "a certain Middle Eastern country."
Thailand has also been at the mercy of Iranian terrorism and separatists in its south. The Thai response has been resolute. This can be seen by a Thai court's conviction and sentencing to death in July last year of an Iranian for murder and the attempted bombing of the Israeli embassy in Bangkok. Thailand is still fighting a small insurgency problem in its south; however, it is not under the thumb of Tehran. For President Ramos, ties with Iran help him get the two things he promised to bring to the Philippines, economic prosperity and peace. It is friendship based on little short of blackmail.
The diplomatic successes achieved by Iran since 1994 have placed it in a good position to resist US-led sanctions. The increased trade and investment from India, Malaysia and Indonesia, as well as military cooperation and diplomatic support all aid Iran in trying to defeat Washington's containment policy.
The West has good reason to fear such developments, as Iran is able to increase its production of more advanced ballistic missiles, develop non-conventional and nuclear weapons, finance terrorist networks throughout Asia and South East Asia, and strengthen its economy simultaneously.
The wisdom of South East Asian countries in warming relations with Iran will be tested over time, as Malaysia has already found, with radical Muslim resistance forces opposing their government. For Western nations like the United States and Australia, which are particularly threatened by Iranian penetration into South East Asia, the challenge is to counter Tehran's initiative. Should Iran gain a substantial foothold in South East Asia, and cement alliances with China and India, the balance of power in the region will be altered, and the prospect of violent conflict will inevitably escalate.
Copyright © 1997 J.O.I.N.