Review 22.3
1 March- 21 March, 1997
- Introduction
- Iran and China
- Iran and India
- Iran and Malaysia
- Iran and Indonesia
- Iran and Philippines
- Conclusion
For the past three years Iranian leaders and diplomats have conducted a concerted push into the Indian Ocean and South East Asia, intent on extending Tehran's influence and alliances to break the US-led containment policy, and further their strategic planning, both in economic and military goals.
Iranian leaders, including Mohammad Javad Larijani, deputy chairman of the Iranian Parliament (Majlis), and Speaker of the Majlis, Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri have emphasised Iran's new "tilt" to Asia. Larinjani said in London last month that Tehran had not "exploited our Asian possibilities enough." Nateq Nuri, the leading candidate to succeed Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani in May elections, firmly supports an "Asian tilt" in Iran's foreign policy.
Rafsanjani, Iran's spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and other government ministers and officials have made numerous visits to China, India, Malaysia, Indonesia and other countries in South East Asia. In all cases they have sought to sign bilateral pacts covering technology sharing, industrial cooperation, trade, and in some cases military and defence relations. Iran has promoted itself as the conduit for future trade to Central Asia, following the successful construction of the Bandar Abbas railway to Turkmenistan's Ashgabat.
By constructing a web of bilateral alliances with major Muslim and non-Muslim states, Iran has been able to position itself as a linchpin in trade, Islamic economics and cooperation, the Non-Aligned Movement, and expand its influence into multilateral regional groupings in Central and South East Asia. These achievements have bolstered the flagging Iranian economy, aiding Tehran's ability to hold out against US sanctions; acquire high technology and non-conventional weapons; and spread its radical Islam into South East Asia through government and opposition groups in different countries.
An October 2, 1996 report leaked from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and published in the Washington Times, alleged that Beijing had sold Iran missile technology, components for an advanced radar system and almost 400 tonnes of chemical precursors for use in developing nerve gas and riot control gas. US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns was quoted as saying that the US Government would "look into this carefully. We do treat very seriously allegations of improper trade of China to Iran."
Chinese officials vigorously denied the allegations, already having suffered high technology sanctions imposed following the discovery of their 1993 export of M-11 medium range ballistic missiles to Pakistan. "This report is purely fictitious and made out of ulterior motives," a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said.
The October 1996 CIA report followed allegations in June 1995. The earlier CIA document described evidence of secret sales to Iran. The transfers included equipment and technical expertise that would enable Tehran to produce its own ballistic missiles. The equipment included machine tools and missile guidance systems. Parts were delivered to Iran over the period June 1994 to June 1995, while similar shipments also went to Pakistan. A Chinese Foreign Ministry official again denied the CIA report, claiming that "China is strictly observing its commitment to the Missile Technology Control Regime."
Concern has also been raised over the sale of Chinese nuclear technology to Iran. In April 1995 US Secretary of State Warren Christopher expressed US opposition to a deal between China and Iran involving the construction of two 300 megawatt nuclear reactors in Iran. This deal, like a similar deal between Russia and Iran covering the construction of a nuclear reactor in Bushehr, raised fears that the reactors could be used to produce weapons grade uranium or plutonium for Tehran's nuclear weapons program.
Military cooperation between China and Iran is the most serious short-term concern. Chinese missile technology would allow Iran to considerably improve the accuracy of its large inventory of SCUD missiles, already able to reach Israel, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Jordan. If the transfer of complete M-11 missiles has occurred, Iran would be in possession of ballistic missiles with a range to accurately strike targets anywhere in the Middle East and much of Europe.
Other high technology programs could also include advanced radars and spare parts for Iranian fighter aircraft. In like manner, Iran could provide some expertise to China in maintenance and engineering of its Russian-made fighter aircraft, for which Iran has developed a significant amount of experience over the last decade.
In December 1996 a high-ranking Iranian military delegation visited China to examine the possibility of acquiring three submarines for the Iranian navy. The submarines under discussion have not been identified, however, they could presumably be the nuclear-powered Han class attack submarines, as Iran is able to purchase the advanced conventional Kilo class submarines from Russia (of which it now has three in service). The acquisition of a nuclear submarine capability would constitute a major threat to all shipping in the Indian Ocean, as well as providing Iran the ability to threaten Israel's trade routes in the Red Sea.
In February this year, China was one of several nations that negotiated contracts with Iran allowing for medium term credit lines to Tehran of US$5 billion. These credit lines will allow the use of approximately US$2.4 billion on 50 infrastructure projects in Iran, including development of the Sorush oil field. Iranian officials put debt commitments at US$30 billion for 1997.
Iran has also gained support from China in opposing the D'Amato sponsored Iran/Libya Sanctions Act, which aims to stop companies investing more than $40 million in energy sector projects in Iran. A Chinese Foreign Ministry official said, "The US act on intensifying sanctions against Iran and Libya is not consistent with ... international relations and will do no good to the settlement of the problem."
China's commitment to increased military cooperation was affirmed by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang on 24 December 1996. In an interview with the Iranian News Agency correspondent in Beijing, Guofang dismissed reports of a downgrading of defence links between Iran and China following talks between Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian and US Defence Secretary William Perry.
Joint economic cooperation projects between Iran and China now number 45, with a contracted amount reaching US$665 million. Energy industry cooperation also continues to strengthen, as evidenced by Chinese Deputy Minister for Machine Building Industries San Chong Ji attending the ground-breaking ceremony for a 1,300 megawatt power plant in Shazand, Iran. Tehran's Energy Minister, Bijan Zanganeh, revealed that China had provided extensive engineering and industrial assistance to Iran in the construction of turbines for hydro-electric power plants, with a 4,400 megawatt output, as well as cooling towers for combined cycle power plants.
While the acquisition of a nuclear submarine capability should not be overstated, as such vessels require a substantial investment that Iran may not be able to sustain, their introduction into the Middle East would severely damage the strategic balance, even to the point of threatening the passage of US Navy vessels approaching the Gulf. The Chinese-Iranian relationship represents a strategic threat to Western interests in the Indian Ocean and Asia. Coupled with growing ties between Iran and India, Tehran is in the process of forging a bloc designed to actively oppose Western interests. Military and other defence related projects between Iran and China represent the most immediate threat, providing the radical state with more advanced missiles and non-conventional weapons with which to threaten its neighbours and undermine the strategic balance in the Middle East.
Those who would scoff that such fears of a regional axis stretching from Iran to China are paranoid fantasies need only read the editorial from the Tehran Times of 14 November 1996. "A congenial atmosphere has already been created for strengthening the Beijing-Islamabad-Tehran axis to replace the alliances and pacts that used to exist in the Cold War era. If this axis is strengthened and extended to include Central Asia and Caucasus, the dependence of the regional countries on the industrialised Western nations will be minimised. Both Iran and China should undertake the task of helping the above dream 'come true'."
In an interview with the London-based Arabic newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Iranian deputy foreign minister for Asian and Pacific Affairs, Ala'eddin Borujerdi denied that Iranian-Chinese relations were based on military cooperation or nuclear weapons. "However, it must be stressed that relations with China have a strategic importance in the eyes of our leadership and senior officials," he said. And with a visit by Chinese President Jiang Zemin pending, the Tehran-Beijing axis will only grow stronger.
As part of its strategy to establish an anti-Western security regime in the Indian Ocean, and build trading and defence relationships through Asia, Tehran has enthusiastically pursued relations with India. New Delhi, in return has reciprocated Iranian overtures in trade and economic cooperation, as well as limited aspects the security and military fields.
Iranian leaders have visited India regularly over the past three years, after a frosty start when Iranian President Rafsanjani cancelled his first ever visit to India in October 1994. The Indian government was offended at the affront and summoned its envoy from Tehran for "urgent consultations". Iran was reportedly keen at the time to expand commercial and defence ties. Relations quickly improved however, and both Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati and the Speaker of the Majlis, Hojatoislam Nateq Nuri visited India late last year, as part of a concerted policy to pressure New Dehli into a pro-Iranian bloc. So intense was Tehran's diplomacy that the Iranian press grew intensely critical of the Indian government following the January 1997 visit to New Delhi of Israel's President Ezer Weizman.
On November 27, 1996, during his visit to the Indian capital, Nateq Nuri described India as an important regional power, having legitimate concerns about the presence of outside (ie. Western - US) power in the region. In return for this vote of confidence, India has reciprocated in opposing the US sanctions against Iran. Indian government officials have indicated that they will continue the policy of opposing US sanctions. A foreign ministry spokesman indicated a parallel strategic policy with Iran on November 28, 1996 saying, "In fact, the United States has never appreciated the growing interactions among New Dehli, Tehran and Beijing, because it fears that this phenomenon could challenge the present unipolar world led by it."
India has received support from Iran in return for its stance vis a vis US policy. Tehran has been very effective in countering Pakistan's anti-India diplomacy in important Islamic countries and groupings, such as the Organisation of Islamic Conferences (OIC). An example of Iranian intervention in support of India occurred in the Human Rights Conference at Geneva in 1994, preventing the passing of a resolution on Kashmir. Military cooperation between India and Iran appears to be limited at this stage. The most significant development involves reports that India aided Iran in equipping its Russian-built Kilo class submarines for warm water operations. Built for operations in the cold waters of the Baltic and North Sea, the Kilo submarines required outfitting to operate in the warmer conditions of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. India has long been an operator of Russian submarines, and is uniquely positioned to help Iran in such maintenance. The Kilo submarine give the Iranian Navy a significant strike capability against shipping approaching the Gulf.
Iranian-Indian relations, however, are based more substantially in general security and other regional issues than in purely military cooperation.
The Iranian regime maintains a standing offer to India to use its good offices to mediate in the disputed Kashmir region. Wisely, however, New Dehli has rejected the Iranian offer, fearing that Iranian influence would further radicalise Muslim separatists in the area. Explaining India's refusal of Iranian mediation, an Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman said on November 28, 1996, "This is a friendly difference. As far as India is concerned, the real importance of Mr Nuri's [Iranian Majlis Speaker] remarks lie in the fact that both New Delhi and Tehran share the same outlook on many international issues, and that both of them view that their increasing bilateral cooperation is mutually beneficial not only in the political field but also in the economic arena."
Iranian successes include the forging of a trilateral agreement between Iran, India and Turkmenistan over the transit of goods, as well as other trade and general economic issues. The agreement forms part of an Iranian push to become the centre for trade with the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. New Dehli is clearly interested in obtaining advantages through agreements with Tehran, and inclined to cooperate with Iranian plans.
To further enhance its position as a conduit for Central Asian trade, Iran is pursuing broad regional cooperation agreements. On a December 1996 visit to Russia, Iran's economics Minister, Morteza Mohammad Khan said that Iran aimed to create a four-armed cooperation agreement between Iran, Russia, China and India. Among the first order of business for Iran is trade with India, which has risen to US$800 million over the last five year period.
While a relatively minor amount in global terms, the trading relationship will certainly grow following the five day visit to India in November last year of a 29-member Iranian parliamentary delegation, led by Majlis Speaker Nateq Nuri and including the ministers of commerce and industry. The group established a joint business council, as well as discussing the possible sale of excess energy to India from Iran. Joint development projects, including power generation and distribution, railways and automotive processing were also discussed. Iran, for example, has already overtaken the West in marketing its petrochemical products to India and China.
Despite Iranian plans, India continues to follow the same dual track policy it did during the Cold War, playing competing powers off against each other. Iran has continually been frustrated by Indian-Israeli relations. The recent visit by Israeli President Ezer Weizman, and his offer to sell India Israeli Kfir fighters, and previous military cooperation with the Jewish state, have all upset the Iranian regime, which cannot reconcile India having good relations with both itself and Israel.
The ultimate goal of Iran's India policy is to forge a strategic alliance against the United States and other Western countries. At an international conference for the Indian Ocean community, Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani said, "The strategic importance and broadness of the Indian Ocean region necessitates that regional states join hands to preserve security and boost cooperation by setting up a powerful forum." "Iran," he claimed, "is a reliable anchor for the ship of peace in the region."
Indian officials have indicated that they view such an alliance favourably, but are weary of allowing Iran to become involved in highly sensitive issues. At the same time, Iran has sought to involve India in regional issues such as peace initiatives in Afghanistan and Indian Ocean security. If the two countries form an alliance the strategic balance across Asia would be effected. Pakistan would be substantially threatened by such a coalition, which would dominate the Indian subcontinent and much of the Indian Ocean.
Copyright © 1997 J.O.I.N.