Review 22.2
15th - 28th February, 1997

Despite appearances to the contrary, Mr Netanyahu has a strategy in dealing with the Palestinians. This strategy was clearly embodied in the agreement linking the Hebron withdrawal with the three Israeli redeployments from Area B. By delaying these pullbacks and limiting their scope, Netanyahu has given his government more options in the final status negotiations, including alternatives to a Palestinian state. While most of the attention was focused on Hebron, the most important issue has always been final status agreement to be concluded by May 1999. Under "Oslo II", Israel withdrew from six cities, and now Hebron, and also pledged to make three more redeployments to "specified military locations".

While these locations are not specified in this agreement, Arafat has stated that he expects this to include from 80% to 90% of the land still under Israeli control. In the Beilin-Mazan plan, although never officially accepted, over 90% of the territory was to be transferred to the Palestinian state. Had such deployments taken place, Israel would have been faced with a fait accompli. With control over most of the territory, the Palestinians could have declared an independent state at any time, without Israeli agreement. Going into the final status negotiations, Netanyahu would have been left without any cards to play. The Palestinians have made it clear that they are going to demand a state, and if Israel refused, Arafat would have had little to lose by acting unilaterally.

Netanyahu has often stated his opposition to a fully sovereign Palestinian state, for pragmatic rather than ideological reasons. From the perspective of security, an independent Palestinian state would be a threat to Israel and a source of instability in the region. Irredentists would seek more and more of Israeli territory, and forge alliances with Iraq and other violent groups in the Middle East. Armed with tactical missiles and other weapons brought through air and sea ports, the Palestinians could disrupt Israeli aircraft and tank movements in the event of war and also be a base for terrorism.

On the other hand, during the negotiations, if Israel continues to control large areas in the disputed territory (approximately 50% or more, distributed in a defensible pattern), the Palestinians will have difficulty unilaterally declaring or being recognized as a viable state.

Beyond a Palestinian state, what are the options for final status? Some have already been discussed by Mr Netanyahu and David Bar-Illon. These include a limited state. Alternatively, there is the possibility of a link to Jordan, perhaps in the form of a federation. In this way, external security and defense would be the responsibility of the Jordanian government, in coordination with Israel, while the Palestinians would enjoy full internal independence and self-determination.

From the perspectives of regional security and stability, a Palestinian-Jordanian federation may be preferable to a Palestinian state. With dreams of full independence, the Palestinians may be reluctant to accept this option, but if they are given the choice of a freeze in the process, with Israel still controlling at least 50% of the territory, or federation, they may be persuaded to accept the latter, or risk losing the gains they made in the Oslo process. It will also be more difficult for Arafat and the PLO to revert to terrorism.

This is the importance of the changes in the original agreements, and not those that pertain to security within Hebron. By delaying the last and most important stage in this process until mid-1988, Netanyahu has the next 18 months to test Palestinian intentions. If, during this time, Arafat insists on a fully sovereign state as the only option, or threatens to declare a state unilaterally, the Israeli side can maintain its current deployments.

In addition to gaining leverage with respect to the Palestinians, the letter that Secretary of State Christopher gave to Prime Minister Netanyahu also strengthens the Israeli position. In this letter, and in the remarks of Dennis Ross, the Americans endorsed Israel's right to decide the nature of the withdrawals in each of the three further redeployments independently, and they are not subject to further negotiations.

This is a reflection of the American understanding of Israeli security concerns, but it is not unlikely that the US government shares the Israeli concerns regarding a unilateral Palestinian declaration of independence. Contrary to the "conventional wisdom", the Israeli government's policies in the Hebron negotiation may have actually saved the peace process. At the same time, Netanyahu has also created the basis for stability after the final status negotiations have been completed. While critics can charge that this took too long, and the price was too high, it was not without logic or benefit.