Review 22.1
1 February - 14 February, 1997

COVER STORY

The commentators have got Benjamin Netanyahu wrong. It's time to reassess the orthodoxy, argues Michael Kapel.

No sooner had Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu been elected than the criticism began. He was a hawk, uncompromising, untested and too young. He had ascended to government on a platform of populism, exploiting the Israeli electorate's anxiety over a peace process seemingly unable to deliver security and the increasingly brazen defiance of the Palestinian authorities to honour the terms of the peace accords. But how much of the popular perception is grounded in fact?

Israel under Netanyahu has received an increasingly hostile press. The isolated instances of Baruch Goldstein and Noam Friedman, two Israeli extremists who initiated terrorist attacks on innocent Palestinians, have served as an opportunity to portray all Jewish settlers as extremists and, more disturbingly, equate Jewish extremists with Palestinian extremists.

But Palestinian and Jewish terrorism are not comparable. Acts of terrorism by an Israeli against Palestinians occur once every couple of years, perpetrated by a handful of extremists, with the support of maybe several hundred of the tens of thousands of settlers. Arab attacks on Israelis are relentless, sometimes 50 or more a year. When Magnus Clark in the Sunday Herald Sun predicts that Jewish settlers - "fundamentalists in occupation since 1967" - will "arrange a rerun of the Noam Friedman incident" or possibly commit suicide en masse, or when Patrick Cockburn in the Canberra Times suggests that "Israeli settlers have in the past reacted to political isolation with extreme violence" or the Sydney Morning Herald editorialises about the danger from "extremists on both sides", there is little differentiation of the minority that has to come to be characterised as the mass.

Yigal Carmon, Prime Minister Begin's former adviser on counter terrorism, argues that while there is political and ideological incitement in Israel it exists on the absolute fringes of Israeli society. Unlike Palestinian life it is has no popular consensus: "At the memorial service for Islamic Jihad chief Fathi Shkaki last October, a senior PLO man, Hanni al-Hassan, addressed the massed mourners, among them the PLO executive," Carmon said. "Shkaki, he told them, was 'great among the great of the Palestinian people, and of the nation,' and a mentor of generations.

"The Israeli equivalent of this would be one of our cabinet ministers saying something of the sort about Baruch Goldstein. Farouk Kadoumi, who continues to serve as PLO foreign minister, has not been coy to define the goals of ongoing Palestinian terrorism.

'The martyrdom operations,' he told an Egyptian paper, 'are one means of pressuring Israel. They are necessary actions'."

Increasingly the differentiation blurs. But Israel remains a constitutional democratic society within the rule of law based on the British common law of its former colonial rulers. Noam Freedman, once tried and if found guilty, will not see a blue sky for the rest of his life. But to the Palestinian martyrs of innumerable violent attacks on Israelis, Arafat pays tribute, and he persists in releasing terrorists, bus bombers, Hamas leaders and murderers from prison.

The incidents that Carmon cites are not unique. They are indicative of a broad and tacit recourse to violent terrorism. Arafat himself repeatedly endorses terrorist actions despite the fact that it is a direct breach of the Oslo accords. So concerned were the Israeli authorities about this that in December 1996 they released the texts of Arafat's recent speeches, including his October address at the Dehaishe refugee camp:

"We know only one word: Jihad, Jihad, Jihad. When we stopped the intifada, we did not stop the jihad for the establishment of a Palestinian state, whose capital is Jerusalem. And we are now entering the phase of the great jihad prior to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state whose capital is Jerusalem... we are in a conflict with the Zionist movement and the Balfour Declaration and all imperialist activities."

There are more than 70 similar examples. Like on October 21 1996, while speaking to Hebron Arab notables urging the use of violence: "Have you run out of stones in Hebron? Prepare the stones".

Or in an October 4 interview in the Palestinian newspaper Al-Ayyam when Arafat called for: "Mass confrontations in all cities and villages to confront the Israeli aggression against Al-Aksa mosque."

Or in an address to Palestinian security forces in Gaza on September 24: "They will fight for Allah, and they will kill and be killed, and this is a solemn oath... Our blood is cheap compared with the cause which has brought us together and which at moments separated us, but shortly we will meet again in heaven... Palestine is our land and Jerusalem is our capital."

On August 6 the New York Times reported Arafat had called Israel a "demon" and urged Arabs to use "all means at their disposal to fight Israel". The same views were endorsed by Muhammad Dahlan, one of Arafat's top security chiefs, who told the Jerusalem Report on November 28:

"The Palestinian Authority does not exclude the return to the armed struggle, and it will then use its weapons."

The numerous recorded accounts of Arafat's recourse to violence makes for harrowing reading but few news organisations referred to it.

While Arafat may reason that Netanyahu was stalling over Hebron, it is hard not to appreciate that any leader would stall a peace process that saw one protagonist so openly and brazenly breaching its accords.

And indeed it was a breach. To the world Arafat continued to successfully portray himself as the victim of a new hard-right regime that would never abide by the previous government's commitments to the Oslo accords nor the much delayed withdrawal from Hebron. In so doing he placed enormous international pressure on the newly elected Israeli government, while at the same time turning Article 22 of the Oslo II accords into a joke.

In his exchange of letters with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on September 9 1993, Arafat wrote " The PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assume their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators." The interim agreement (Oslo II) of September 28 1995 (Article XXII) states that Israel and the Palestinian Authority "shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and shall accordingly a bstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda against each other".

By the time Arafat had finished his Che Guevara oratory at the end of 1996 Article 22 meant as much as the 'democratic' title inserted into the names of former eastern European satellite states. But with the same speed that Arafat was shattering the accords the world was blaming Netanyahu.

To compound the antagonism Arafat refused to heed the warnings by Israeli security forces to arrest and prevent the activities of PFLP activists planning terrorist operations against Israel. When the PFLP finally struck in November they killed two Israeli civilians, Etta and Ephraim Tzur from the Israeli town of Beit El. Arafat knew of the PFLP's plans but did not move to stop them.

But perhaps no action more illustrates the refusal of the Palestinian Authority to truly abandon the recourse to violence and terror as legitimate political instruments than the refusal to renounce aspects of the Palestinian Charter that do not accept Israel's right to exist. With much fanfare last year Arafat called a full meeting of the Palestinian National Council to amend the charter. But the much trumpeted changes to the covenant acknowledging Israel's right to exist were never made. It was yet anoth er breach of the Oslo accords joining the long list of violations including allowing the release of terrorists, refusing to hand over to Israel known criminals seeking sanctuary in Palestinian areas, and turning the Palestinian police force from a lightly armed police constabulary into a heavily armed militia.

Patrick Cockburn of the Independent (London) writing in the Canberra Times claimed that Netanyahu had deliberately indulged in a "series of provocations" towards the Palestinians to prove his thesis "Be tough with them and they will come running". It reflects a persistent theme. The Hebron deal was delayed because of Netanyahu's intransigence. But months before Netanyahu had already agreed to withdraw from Hebron. Arafat refused, seeking instead to attach a timetable to the current agreement for three further withdrawals after Hebron, and stumping his violent rhetoric to his Palestinian followers.

The day after the Hebron peace deal, Amin Saikal, Director of the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies at the Australian National University was moved to predict that the accord had pushed the "region to the brink of another explosion." Why? Hold your breath for the possibility of Palestinian non-compliance. No way. The issues that will decide the future of the peace process will be how Netanyahu responds to "Jerusalem and Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza", "the return of Palestinian refugees", "the determination of the final borders of Palestine", "Palestinian sovereignty", and "further troop withdrawals from the west bank". Saikal begrudgingly acknowledged Netanyahu's unprecedented concession. But there is no mention of the Palestinians failing to keep to the accords.

It is difficult to fully appreciate the immensity of Ze'ev Chafets, noted in the New York Times: "To say yes to Hebron, Mr Netanyahu had to jettison 50 years of revisionist orthodoxy about the indivisibility of the land of Israel. He had to renounce his own previous writings and speeches, to break ideologically with the father he venerates, to alienate the West Bank settlers who helped elect him and to infuriate many in his Likud Party. He is also risking his life."

But the vote and the fact that a Likud Government delivered on Hebron brings home an important point not lost on the Palestinian leadership. There is an overwhelmingly solid middle ground in Israel that is prepared to support and implement the peace process. Even a Likud government is prepared to accept the principle of trading land for peace. This places the peace process on a stronger footing than ever before. The strong ideological and political opposition to both Rabin and Peres's preparedness to hand over territory has been defused by Likud. The Hebron withdrawal, which Shimon Peres as Prime Minister deferred, sensing the dangerous political climate, was finally delivered by Netanyahu.

In many ways a Likud Government can deliver where others cannot. In the same way that only President Nixon, the fervent anti-Communist and one-time aide to Senator Joe McCarthy, was able to establish diplomatic relations with China, Netanyahu may be looked upon to carry the country not only with the Palestinians but also with Syria. All of which poses a dilemma for Israel's Arab partners. With the fruits of peace come the obligations and the Arab world has not been too forthcoming with the obligations. Will terrorism stop? Will the shocking rhetoric from Arafat and increasingly Egypt's Mubarak and Syria's Assad abate? Or will the Hebron deal be a repeat of past performances when Arafat, in chorus with the Arab world, clamours for a withdrawal only to fail to deliver the benefits of autonomy to their constituency and start screaming i n four months that the withdrawal is not enough, that now it's time for Jerusalem and beyond?

Argues Middle East expert Stephen Cohen: "For years now the Arabs who made peace with Israel have wanted the fruits of peace without the obligations of peace and without the relationships that peace mandated. As long as Israel seemed divided and ambivalent on the land for peace question, Arab leaders had an excuse for not going ahead with all the relations. But with Israel now clearly committed to trading land for peace on the West Bank, the Arab leaders will have to put up or shut up."

The Jerusalem Post echoed the view with more force in its editorial on the day the agreement was announced. "It seems the Palestinians have succeeded in selling Israel the same bridge over and over again. Arafat first renounced terrorism in December 1988, leading to the opening of the US-PLO dialogue. However, the intifada continued until Arafat renounced violence again in the 1993 Declaration of Principles - the beginning of the Oslo process. In August 1995, Arafat signed the Cairo agreement, which committed the Palestinians to combat terrorism against Israel."

But only days after the withdrawal from Hebron the danger signs are there. Jibril Rajoub, the Palestinian security chief, delivered the first speech of a Palestinian official since the handover. " We tell (the Israeli settlers) that their place is not with us. They are big stones on our chest, so we have to take them off." In case the message is not clear Palestinian transport Minister Ali Kawasmi reiterated the view, claiming "part of Hebron is still under occupation. So we will struggle, both the government and the people, in order to liberate the rest of Hebron". Yet Section 7 of the Hebron agreement states that "Both sides reiterate their commitment to maintain normal life throughout the city of Hebron and to prevent any provocation or friction that may affect normal life in the city."

While Arafat made peaceful overtures - "While I stand here in Hebron I tell the settlers, we do not want confrontation" - he also told the assembled throng that he would not stop until he created "a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital". That night, Marius Schattner from Agence France Press reported that "Jewish settlers yesterday rejected an olive branch extended by the Palestinian leader". The story ran in Australian papers under the heading "Hebron Jews reject Arafat's olive branch".

But if his aides don't realise it, it appears that Arafat does. Any further advancement on Israeli territorial withdrawals in the West Bank will now be conditional on mutuality. Israel's cabinet may have been divided on the deal but it agreed on one issue. "The central condition for continuing the process with the Palestinians is the mutual upholding of commitments that each side made." That's always been explicit in the peace accords but Arafat always knew that Labour would turn a blind eye to his repeat ed breaches. Likud won't and Arafat knows it. For Arafat there's more land for the taking but this time each time he takes he has to keep to the promise that he gives. If Arafat continues to stuff his police force with Kalashnikov machineguns and shoulder-launched missiles, or continues to incite violence, or continues to breach the terms of the accords then all bets are off.

But that still poses one small problem for Israel. No one listens when Israel cites Palestinian failures to keep their agreements as the reason for no further concessions. The world is mesmerised by the Middle East peace deal, the hand shake on the White House lawn, the Nobel Prize laureates. The world wants to see the deal implemented, and excuses that the other side is not keeping its end of the bargain are of little interest to the commentators who pontificate on the "big picture".

Should we really care what the commentators say? Certainly their very existence is not imperilled by the outcomes of their gratuitous advice. And more often than not they are either wrong, woefully misinformed or slavishly follow popular orthodoxy and dangerous agendas. Two examples from the The Australian are instructive.

On May 31 1996, only a day after the surprise announcement of a Likud victory in the Israeli elections, Dr Colin Rubenstein, a senior lecturer in Middle East politics at Monash University and Editorial Chairman of the Review, wrote a commentary piece in The Australian. "So what would a Netanyahu Government look like? Almost certainly there will be much gloom and doom, gnashing of teeth and predictions of disaster for the peace process in Western political and media circles, not to speak of Arab capitals a nd opponents of Israel. Obituaries for the peace process will insist that a Netanyahu Government could never carry through the achievements of Rabin and Peres to a successful conclusion."

Rubenstein then went on to argue: "But scepticism towards this conventional wisdom is warranted. Netanyahu, 47, and his likely Knesset supporters represent a new generation of political leadership, with the potential for political and economic innovation and renewal. Certainly his style will be different from either Peres or Rabin, but he also represents a generational break from his hardline Likud predecessors, Begin and Shamir."

Prophetic words. Eight months later Rubenstein was proved right. Netanyahu is clearly not encumbered by Likud orthodoxy. He has proved himself innovative and in the face of obituaries for the peace process has succeeded where Peres was unable to. He has been the victim of much false hysteria in the West and appalling rhetorical attacks from Arab countries supposedly at peace with Israel.

Seven months later on December 20 1996, Professor Amin Saikal contributed an opinion to The Australian listing a series of claims as to how Netanyahu would destroy the peace process.

"Many Israeli and some non- Israeli analysts gave Netanyahu the benefit of the doubt. They argued that once in power, he would have little option but to honour Israel's commitments under the peace process. He was widely touted as ultimately an intelligent, pragmatic politician, who was deft and skilful in pursuit of his political ambitions... However, this is not what has eventuated."

Unfortunately for Saikal, less than one month later it did eventuate. A month later, Saikal still couldn't admit his error. Rather, he made the bizarre claim that the Hebron deal has "pushed the region to the brink of another explosion". But there was more to come. Netanyahu would never make territorial concessions because he is "vulnerable to the support of extreme minority parties and similar elements within his own parties, who are well represented in his Cabinet, including the Minister for National Reconstruction, Ariel Sharon. This increasingly constrains him so that even if he finds it pragmatically necessary to change course, he is not electorally and politically in a conducive position to do so. His options are dangerously narrowed to one; that is to remain intransigent and diversionary, so as to avoid giving a fruitful impetus to the peace process."

And with all that Saikal proved himself hopelessly wrong. But wait, there's more. Just for good measure Saikal accuses Netanyahu of leading Israel towards "civil war in the country", of undermining Israeli democracy and accuses Israel of being a "confessionally expansionist State".

If Saikal got it wrong only four weeks before the deal was signed how does one interpret the comments of Dr Jeremy Salt who teaches modern Middle Eastern history in the Department of Politics at the University of Melbourne. Dr Salt contributed this comment to the Sydney Morning Herald on Thursday January 16, the day after the Hebron deal was struck: "There can be no unhappier man in the world than Yasser Arafat. The massive concessions he made to the Israeli government...."

Only days later we learn that Arafat is elated. Israel has made unprecedented concessions. The Likud for the first time has accepted land for peace. Arafat held out over tortuous months for more than he had ever hoped for in May. But here's worse to come from Salt:

" His (Netanyahu's) provocations of the Palestinians - triggering off a mini intifada after he tampered with the religious status quo in Jerusalem late last year - and of the Arab states, indicate that even worse might be in store, perhaps a war that would simultaneously allow Israel to iron out the last wrinkle on the board - Syria - while cracking down on the West Bank in the name of security and perhaps precipitating amid the turmoil another flight of the Palestinians. Netanyahu's constituents are some of the most extreme people in the Middle East."

On the same day the New York Times published a commentary piece from Israeli commentator Zeev Chafets:

"Knowing who Mr Netanyahu really is will makes life less stressful for all of us. We no longer have to worry that he will risk war for the sake of Jewish "holy places". Nor will he likely stonewall us into international pariah status over the hard decisions ahead: surrendering most of the Golan Heights, withdrawing troops from southern Lebanon, agreeing to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and even allowing some sort of Arab political control in East Jerusalem."

But Dr Salt pushes on. "It is somewhat ironical that in this Government the Middle East finally has the combination against which the United States has been warning for years - an extremist government ... with access to hundreds of nuclear weapons." You would have to pull out your 1970s editions of the Australasian Spartacist to find such undergraduate commentary.

No matter what Netanyahu appears to do, how legitimate, how significant the concession, he is subject to the fiercest and most irrational international criticism. In an interview on November 22 in the quality Israeli daily Haaretz, Netanyahu was asked how he dealt with this: "Contrary to what they say about me, and unlike other leaders, I do not lack direction nor do I behave like a weather vane. I know where I am going, and those who know where they are going have a compass and know how to navigate. You plan in advance for margins of error so that if you encounter difficulties, you can take a bypass, sometimes to the right and sometimes to the left, while continuing to move towards the objective you set beforehand. When you know where you are going, everything is much simpler. That's how things are with me, despite what the papers say."

And for that we are all grateful..