Review 21.18
11 November - 24 November 1996

In 1992, when he was elected to the US Presidency, Bill Clinton was largely an unknown commodity on foreign policy issues. As the former Governor of Arkansas, he had no foreign policy experience. Further, the 1992 electoral campaign between Clinton and then President Bush was fought almost entirely on domestic American issues. This was exemplified by Mr Clinton's unofficial campaign slogan, "It's the Economy, Stupid."

On Israel and the Middle East, it was known that Clinton and his Vice-Presidential Candidate Al Gore spoke much more warmly about US-Israeli ties than Bush ever had. Yet many well-informed commentators had expressed doubts about whether this rhetoric would have much policy effect in a Clinton administration. Daniel Pipes, one of the US's most astute academic commentators on Middle East policy, argued that trendy anti-Israelism among many in the Democratic party, including some of Clinton's close advisers, could take over and be disastrous for Israel and the peace process. Similarly, Australian commentators worried about the effects a Clinton electoral win could have on our own region.

Following Clinton's inauguration, Greg Sheridan, The Australian's Foreign Affairs commentator, wrote that Bill Clinton's stances on crucial Asian-Pacific regional issues like Chinese human rights, the Korean peninsula crisis, trade with Japan, US troop redeployments and APEC, were "as clear as mud." Looking back over the last four years, an outside observer has reason to both be reassured and even impressed with the achievements of the Clinton administration.

Internationally, the list of accomplishments of American diplomacy cannot be overlooked, including the successful intervention in Haiti, the Dayton accords for Bosnia and reasonable management of Russian and Eastern European diplomacy. Clinton's policy to expound and encourage the expansion of democracy and human rights is to be applauded, though it has sometimes been followed through less strongly and consistently than one might wish.

It is true that Clinton's foreign policy has sometimes seemed to lack direction, to be merely muddling through, without expressing any grand principles. To some extent, this should be no surprise. Mr Clinton's leadership style has always been that of consensus builder, not an enunciator of grand visions. But if Mr Clinton's foreign policy has been opportunistic and reactive, it has seized opportunities presented and reacted to crises reasonably well. And, when necessary, Clinton has been able to show admirable toughness and resolve.

He handled at least three crises concerning the ongoing problems with Iraq in a way that has made it clear that Saddam Hussein will not be allowed to re-emerge as a threat to his regional neighbours. On the issue of terrorism, Clinton has probably outperformed any American President in recent memory; when it became clear that various extremist groups used the US as a base, the President issued an executive order prohibiting transactions with such groups.

Similarly, in the face of overwhelming evidence of Iranian sponsorship of huge amounts of international terrorism, Clinton not only acted to block Russian and Chinese transfers of nuclear technology to Iran, but was willing to exhibit real leadership in the face of appeasement and engagement by other Western countries. America, at considerable economic cost to itself, became the first country to invoke sanctions against trade and major energy investments which economically facilitated Iranian terrorism. On the Middle East, Clinton deserves as much credit over the last four years for what he hasn't done as for what he has.

His willingness to throw full support behind the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo accords, which were negotiated essentially behind the backs of US intermediaries, showed a willingness to put peace before procedural niceties. In general, with the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Clinton and his key Middle East negotiators, Warren Christopher, Dennis Ross and Martin Indyk, have been reasonably successful in a delicate balancing act, largely staying out of negotiations when things were progressing by themselves, and stepping in to persuade, conciliate and reassure only when really needed. The US deserves credit for its willingness to provide aid and other benefits to help along the process; US trade and aid concessions to Jordan were particularly important in facilitating the Israeli-Jordanian peace. In general, despite the predictions of the 1992 doomsayers, objective observers can have few complaints about Mr Clinton's performance on the Middle East; for both peace and continued survival of Israel, this has been one of the best White Houses in living memory.

As for Australia, here too the Clinton administration has turned out better than fears suggested. US commitments to defence in the Pacific have survived defence cuts relatively unscathed. Mr Clinton's willingness to back moves to limit weapons of mass destruction, including especially the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, can only be welcomed in a region which has only just experienced French and Chinese nuclear tests. Free trade, including APEC, the World Trade Organisation, and NAFTA, continue to be US priorities.

The US record is somewhat blemished by ongoing agricultural subsidies and so-called "anti-dumping" regulations which have injured Australian exports. While Clinton clearly has his shortcomings, especially in terms of leading an attempt to form broad principles for the post-Cold War era, Australians should be relatively sanguine about another four years of Bill Clinton's stewardship of the world's most powerful nation.